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Abstract
We propose a sequential optimizing betting strategy in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game
in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001) [10]. By studying the asymptotic
behavior of its capital process, we prove a generalization of the strong law of large numbers, where the
convergence rate of the sample mean vector depends on the growth rate of the quadratic variation process.
The growth rate of the quadratic variation process may be slower than the number of rounds or may even
be zero. We also introduce an information criterion for selecting efficient betting items. These results are
then applied to multiple asset trading strategies in discrete-time and continuous-time games. In the case of
a continuous-time game we present a measure of the jaggedness of a vector-valued continuous process. Our
results are examined by several numerical examples.
c⃝ 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since the advent of the game-theoretic probability and finance by Shafer and Vovk [10], the
field has been expanding rapidly. The present authors have been contributing to this emerging
field by showing the essential role of the Kullback–Leibler divergence for the strong law of large
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numbers (SLLN) [7,8] and by proposing a new approach to continuous-time games [13,14]. Our
approach to continuous-time games has been further developed by Vovk [16–19]. By these works
it has now become clear that game-theoretic no-arbitrage condition implies many properties of
idealized continuous price paths without any probabilistic assumptions.
In this paper we propose a sequential optimizing betting strategy for the multi-dimensional
bounded forecasting game in discrete time and apply it as a high-frequency limit order type
betting strategy for vector-valued continuous price processes.
Our strategy is very flexible and the analysis of its asymptotic behavior allows us to generalize
game-theoretic statements of SLLN to a wide variety of cases. SLLN for the bounded forecasting
game is already established in Chapter 3 of [10]. In [7] we gave a simple strategy forcing SLLN
with the rate of O(

log n/n), where n is the number of rounds. However the convergence rate of
SLLN should depend on the growth rate of the quadratic variation process. For example, in view
of Kolmogorov’s three series theorem (e.g. Section IV.2 of [11]), the sum sn = x1+· · ·+xn ∈ R1
of centered independent measure-theoretic random variables converges a.s. if the sum of their
variances converges (i.e.
∑
n Var(xn) <∞). Therefore in this case the sample average x¯n = sn/n
is of order O(1/n). By our sequential optimizing betting strategy, we can give a unified game-
theoretic treatment on the asymptotic behavior of sn , which depends on the asymptotic behavior
of the observed sum of squares
∑n
i=1 x2i as n →∞.
The strength of our results can be seen when we interpret our results in the standard measure-
theoretic framework. By the generality of probability games (Chapter 8 of [10]), our game-
theoretic result can be immediately translated into measure-theoretic statements. Let sn =
x1 + · · · + xn be a one-dimensional measure-theoretic martingale w.r.t. a filtration {Fn} with
uniformly bounded differences |xn| ≤ 1, a.e. Let Vn = x21 + · · · + x2n . Then with probability one
the sequence |sn|/

max(1, Vn log Vn), n = 1, 2, . . . , is bounded. See Proposition 2.1 below.
Note that in this statement no assumption is made on the growth rate of Vn . The rate itself may
be random. In the measure-theoretic framework the law of the iterated logarithm for martingales
was proved by [12,15]. Our rate

Vn log Vn is weaker. However the measure-theoretic results
compare sn to the sum of conditional variances
∑n
i=1 E(x2i |Fi−1), whereas in our result Vn is
the observed sum of squares. As far as we know, our result involving Vn is new also in the
measure-theoretic framework.
From a more practical viewpoint, our sequential betting strategy is very simple to implement
even for high dimensions and shows a very competitive performance when applied to various
price processes. In Section 6 we compare the performance of our strategy with the well-known
universal portfolio strategy developed by Cover [3], Cover and Ordentlich [4], Ordentlich and
Cover [9] and Cover and Thomas [5]. The performance of our sequential betting strategy
is competitive against the universal portfolio. Note that the numerical integration needed for
implementing the universal portfolio is computationally heavy for high dimensions.
When we can bet on a large number of price processes, it is not always best to form a portfolio
comprising all price processes, because estimating the best weight vector for the price processes
might take a long time. By approximating the capital process of our sequential optimizing
strategy, we will introduce an information criterion for selecting price processes in a portfolio.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the multi-dimensional
bounded forecasting game, introduce our sequential optimizing strategy and state our main
theoretical result. In Section 3 we give a proof of our result by analyzing the asymptotic behavior
of its capital process. We also introduce an information criterion for selecting efficient betting
items. These results are then applied to multiple asset trading games in Section 4. In Section 4 we
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formulate the multiple asset trading game in continuous time and based on high-frequency limit
order type betting strategies we present a measure for the jaggedness of a path of a vector-valued
continuous process. In Section 5, to indicate the generality of our results, we provide a multi-
dimensional Girsanov theorem for geometric Brownian motion and an argument concerning the
mutual information between betting games. In Section 6 we give numerical results for several
Japanese stock price processes. We conclude the paper with some discussions in Section 7.
2. A sequential optimizing strategy that forces a new strong law of large numbers
We treat the following type of discrete-time bounded forecasting game between Skeptic and
Reality. K0 is Skeptic’s initial capital, D is a compact region in Rd such that its convex hull coD
contains the origin in its interior, and · denotes the standard inner product of Rd .
DISCRETE-TIME BOUNDED FORECASTING GAME
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ Rd .
Reality announces xn ∈ D.
Kn = Kn−1 + Mn · xn .
END FOR
In this paper we regard d-dimensional vectors such as xn = (x1n , . . . , xdn )t as column vectors
with t denoting the transpose. ‖x‖ = √x tx = √x · x denotes the Euclidean norm of x . Letting
αn = Mn/Kn−1, we can rewrite Skeptic’s capital as Kn = Kn−1(1 + αn · xn), αn ∈ Rd . In the
protocol, we require that Skeptic observes his collateral duty, in the sense that Kn ≥ 0 for all n
irrespective of Reality’s moves x1, x2, . . . .
For constructing a strategy of Skeptic, assume that Skeptic himself generates ‘training data’
{x−n0+1, x−n0+2, . . . , x0} of size n0 ≥ d + 1. This operation is similar to a construction of a
prior distribution in Bayesian statistics, where a prior distribution can be specified by a set of
prior observations. Throughout this paper we fix arbitrarily ϵ0 ∈ (0, 1) and choose the training
data {x−n0+1, . . . , x0} in such a way that
1+ α · xn ≥ 0, n = −n0 + 1, . . . , 0 ⇒ 1+ α · x ≥ ϵ0, ∀x ∈ D. (1)
Let Pdn0,ϵ0 = {α | 1+ α · xn ≥ 0, n = −n0 + 1, . . . , 0}. Then (1) is equivalent to
Pdn0,ϵ0 ⊂ −(1− ϵ0)(co D)⊥,
where (co D)⊥ denotes the convex dual of co D. For example, for d = 1 and D = [−1, 1], we
can take x−1 = 1/(1 − ϵ0) and x0 = −1/(1 − ϵ0). Then α has to satisfy |α| ≤ 1 − ϵ0 and the
right-hand side of (1) holds. For general D ⊂ Rd let δ¯ = maxx∈D ‖x‖ and let c = δ¯
√
d/(1−ϵ0).
Then we can take n0 = 2d training vectors as
(0, . . . , 0,±c, 0, . . . , 0)t,
where c is in the i-th coordinate (1 ≤ i ≤ d). Then each element αi , 1 ≤ i ≤ d , of
α = (α1, . . . , αd)t has to satisfy |αi | ≤ 1/c and ‖α‖ ≤ (1 − ϵ0)/δ¯. Hence the right-hand
side of (1) holds by Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. It should also be noted that (1) implies that the
training vectors span the whole Rd .
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The strategy with a constant vector αn ≡ α ∈ Rd is called a constant proportional betting
strategy. For N ≥ 0 we define
Φ0,N (α) =
N−
n=−n0+1
log(1+ α · xn), (2)
which is the log capital at round N under the constant proportional betting strategy, including
the training data. We add ‘0’ to the subscript to indicate that the training data are included in a
summation. Since the game starts at time 1, actually the log capital of the constant proportional
betting strategy is Φ0,N (α)− Φ0,0(α) =∑Nn=1 log(1+ α · xn).
Let us consider the maximization of Φ0,N (α) with respect to α ∈ Rd . The maximum
corresponds to the log capital at time N of a ‘hindsight’ constant proportional betting strategy.
Note thatΦ0,N (α) is a strictly concave function of α. The condition (1) ensures that the maximum
of Φ0,N (α) is attained at the unique point α = α∗N in the interior of Pdn0,ϵ0 so that
∂Φ0,N
∂α

α=α∗N
=
N−
n=−n0+1
xn
1+ α∗N · xn
= 0. (3)
From a numerical viewpoint we note that the maximization of Φ0,N (α) is straightforward even
in high dimensions.
We now define the sequential optimizing strategy (SOS) of Skeptic, which is a realizable
strategy unlike the hindsight strategy. It is given by
αn = α∗n−1, n ≥ 1. (4)
The idea of SOS is very simple. We employ the empirically best constant proportion until the
previous round for betting at the current round. Note that SOS depends on the choice of the
training data. Skeptic’s log capital logK∗1,N at round N under SOS is written as
logK∗1,N =
N−
n=1
log(1+ α∗n−1 · xn).
Let ξ = x1x2 · · · ∈ D∞ denote a path, which is an infinite sequence of Reality’s moves.
The set Ω = D∞ of paths is called the sample space and any subset E of Ω is called
an event. ξn = x1 . . . xn denotes a partial path of Reality until the round n. A strategy P
specifies αn in terms of ξn−1, i.e. αn = P(ξn−1). The capital process under P is given as
KP1,N =
∏N
n=1(1 + P(ξn−1) · xn). P is called prudent, if Skeptic observes his collateral duty
by P , i.e. KP1,N ≥ 0, ∀N ≥ 0, irrespective of Reality’s moves x1, x2, . . . . In this paper we only
consider prudent strategies for Skeptic. We say that Skeptic can weakly force an event E ⊂ Ω
by a strategy P if lim supN KP1,N = ∞ for every ξ ∉ E . As in Section 1 we write
sN = x1 + · · · + xN ∈ Rd , VN = x1x t1 + · · · + xN x tN (: d × d). (5)
Then tr VN =∑Nn=1 ‖xn‖2. We are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 2.1. The sequential optimizing strategy for Skeptic weakly forces
E : lim sup
N
‖sN‖
max(1, tr VN log(tr VN ))
<∞. (6)
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The maximum in the denominator is needed only for the case that supN tr VN ≤ 1, such as
when 0 ∈ D and Reality always chooses xn ≡ 0. It is important to emphasize that E in (6) is
weakly forced irrespective of the rate of growth of tr VN , including the zero-growth case, i.e. the
case that tr VN converges to a finite value. A measure-theoretic interpretation of our result shows
its flexibility. When xn’s are measure-theoretic martingale differences, then the capital process
under SOS is a non-negative measure-theoretic martingale, which converges to a finite value
almost surely. The method for deriving measure-theoretic from game-theoretic results explained
in Chapter 8 of [10] allows us to derive the following proposition from Theorem 2.1.
Proposition 2.1. Let sn = x1 + · · · + xn be a d-dimensional measure-theoretic martingale
w.r.t. a filtration {Fn}. Assume that the differences xn ∈ D are uniformly bounded a.e. Then
with probability one the sequence ‖sn‖/

max(1, tr Vn log(trVn)), n = 1, 2, . . . , is bounded.
Let λmax,N and λmin,N denote the maximum and the minimum eigenvalues of VN . Consider
the event
E ′ : lim
N
log λmax,N
λmin,N
= 0. (7)
Theorem 2.1 gives only the order of sN . If we condition the paths on the event E ′, then we can
derive a more accurate numerical bound as follows.
Theorem 2.2. By the sequential optimizing strategy Skeptic can weakly force
E ′ ⇒ lim sup
N
stN V
−1
N sN
log |VN | ≤ 1.
This theorem follows from the fact that on E ′ Skeptic can weakly force α∗N → 0, as shown in
the proof of this theorem in Section 3.4.
Note that λmin,N → ∞ on E ′. Note also that E in (6) holds if and only if
lim supN ‖sN‖/

max(1, λmax,N log λmax,N ) < ∞, because λmax,N ≤ tr VN ≤ dλmax,N . Hence
on E ′ we have
1 ≥ lim sup
N
stN V
−1
N sN
log |VN | ≥ lim supN
‖sN‖2
dλmax,N log λmax,N
.
Therefore, although we only have a conditional statement in Theorem 2.2, it gives a more
accurate numerical bound than Theorem 2.1.
3. Proof of the theorem and some other results on sequential optimizing strategy
In this section we provide proofs of the above theorems and present other results on the
sequential optimizing strategy.
3.1. Properties of α∗N and the empirical risk neutral distribution
Let δx denote a unit point mass at x ∈ Rd and let gN = ∑Nn=−n0+1 δxn/(N + n0) denote
the empirical distribution of the training data and Reality’s moves x1, . . . , xN up to round N . In
view of (3) we define the empirical risk neutral distribution g∗N up to round N by
g∗N =
1
N + n0
N−
n=−n0+1
δxn
1+ α∗N · xn
.
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For notational simplicity we omit ‘0’ from the subscript of gN and g∗N , although they involve the
training data. g∗N is indeed a probability measure, because by (3) we have−
xn
g∗N ({xn}) =
1
N + n0
N−
n=−n0+1
1
1+ α∗N · xn
= 1
N + n0
N−
n=−n0+1
1+ α∗N · xn
1+ α∗N · xn
= 1,
where the summation on the left-hand side is over distinct values of xn , n = −n0 + 1, . . . , N .
By Eg∗N [·] we denote the expected value under g∗N . Then (3) is written as Eg∗N [x] = 0.
The log capital log K¯∗0,N = Φ0,N (α∗N ) of the constant hindsight strategy α∗N up to round N
including the training data is expressed as
log K¯∗0,N = Φ0,N (α∗N ) = (N + n0)
−
xn
gN ({xn}) log gN ({xn})g∗N ({xn})
= (N + n0)D(gN ‖ g∗N ), (8)
where D(gN ‖ g∗N ) denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence between two probability
distributions gN and g∗N .
Now note that log(1+ α∗n−1 · xn) = Φ0,n(α∗n−1)−Φ0,n−1(α∗n−1). By summation by parts, the
difference log K¯∗0,N − logK∗1,N between the hindsight strategy and SOS can be expressed as
log K¯∗0,N − logK∗1,N =
N−
n=1
1Φn + Φ0,0(α∗0), (9)
where 1Φn = Φ0,n(α∗n) − Φ0,n(α∗n−1) ≥ 0 and Φ0,0(α∗0) is a constant depending only on the
training data. We will analyze the behavior the log capital logK∗1,N of SOS by analyzing log K¯∗0,N
and
∑N
n=0 1Φn .
We call
V¯ ∗N =
1
N + n0 V
∗
0,N = Eg∗N [xx t] =
1
N + n0
N−
n=−n0+1
xn x tn
1+ α∗N · xn
the empirical risk neutral covariance matrix for Reality’s moves up to round N . Write
s0,N =
N−
n=−n0+1
xn, x¯0,N = 1N + n0 s0,N .
Noting gN ({xn}) = (1+ α∗N · xn)g∗N ({xn}), we have
x¯0,N = EgN [x] = Eg∗N [(1+ α∗N · x)x] = Eg∗N [x] + Eg∗N [xx t]α∗N = Eg∗N [xx t]α∗N .
Therefore α∗N is expressed as
α∗N = V¯ ∗−1N x¯0,N = V ∗−10,N s0,N . (10)
Since V¯ ∗N itself contains α∗N , (10) does not give an explicit expression of α∗N . However it is a very
useful exact relation for our analysis.
We now consider 1α∗n = α∗n − α∗n−1. In the following we use the notation
xn(α) = xn1+ α · xn .
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Taking the difference of the following two equalities
0 =
n−
i=−n0+1
xi (α
∗
n), 0 =
n−1
i=−n0+1
xi (α
∗
n−1)
we obtain
0 =
n−1
i=−n0+1
xi
(α∗n−1 − α∗n) · xi
(1+ α∗n−1 · xi )(1+ α∗n · xi )
+ xn(α∗n).
Therefore
n−1
i=−n0+1
xi x ti
(1+ α∗n−1 · xi )(1+ α∗n · xi )

(α∗n − α∗n−1) = xn(α∗n).
Note that the denominator on the left-hand side is a scalar and the matrix on the left-hand side is
positive definite. Then
1α∗n = V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n), (11)
where V0,n−1(α, β) =∑n−1i=−n0+1 xi (α)xi (β)t.
Concerning the behavior of 1α∗n we state the following lemma, which will be used in
Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.1. limn 1α∗n = 0 for every ξ ∈ D∞.
We give a proof of this lemma in Appendix.
3.2. Bounding the difference between the hindsight strategy and SOS from above
We now give a detailed analysis of
∑N
n=1 1Φn on the right-hand side of (9) and bound it from
above. We note the following simple fact on 1Φn :
1Φ,n = Φ0,n(α∗n)− Φ0,n(α∗n−1) = Φ0,n−1(α∗n)− Φ0,n−1(α∗n−1)+ log
1+ α∗n · xn
1+ α∗n−1 · xn
≤ log 1+ α
∗
n · xn
1+ α∗n−1 · xn
= log

1+ 1α
∗
n · xn
1+ α∗n−1 · xn

, (12)
where the inequality holds since α∗n−1 maximizes Φn−1(α). Substituting (11) into the right-hand
side we obtain
1Φn ≤ log(1+ xn(α∗n)tV0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n−1)). (13)
Note that we can also rewrite
1+ xn(α∗n)tV0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n−1) =
|V0,n(α∗n−1, α∗n)|
|V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)|
, (14)
where we used a well-known relation between determinants (e.g. Corollary A.3.1 of [1]).
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Let
C1 = max
 sup
α∈−(co D)⊥, x∈D
(1+ α · x), sup
−n0+1≤n≤0
α∈Pdn0,ϵ0
(1+ α · xn)
 , (15)
which is a constant depending only on the training data. The first argument C1,0 =
supα∈−(co D)⊥, x∈D(1 + α · x) on the right-hand side of (15) corresponds to the maximum one-
step growth rate of Skeptic’s capital under the collateral duty and C1,0 equals 2 if D is symmetric
w.r.t. the origin. C1,0 may be large if D is highly asymmetric w.r.t. the origin. For example, for
d = 1 and D = [−0.1, 1], we have C1,0 = 11.
For two symmetric matrices A, B, let A ≥ B mean that A − B is non-negative definite. Then
V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n) ≥
1
C21
V0,n−1,
where V0,n−1 = V0,n−1(0, 0) = ∑ni=−n0+1 xi x ti . Note that V0,n−1 is positive definite because
of the training data, although Vn−1 in (5) may be singular. Note also that 1 + α∗m · xn ≥ ϵ0 for
m, n ≥ 1. Therefore
xn(α
∗
n)
tV0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n−1) ≤ C2x tn V−10,n−1xn, C2 =
C21
ϵ20
.
Hence we can bound
N−
n=1
1Φn ≤
N−
n=1
log(1+ C2x tn V−10,n−1xn).
Write an = x tn V−10,n−1xn ≥ 0. Note that 1 + an = |V0,n|/|V0,n−1|. Also for c ≥ 1 and a ≥ 0 we
have 1+ ac ≤ (1+ a)c and hence
log(1+ ac) ≤ c log(1+ a).
Therefore
N−
n=1
log(1+ C2an) ≤ C2
N−
n=1
log(1+ an) = C2 log |V0,N ||V0,0| .
Now we have proved the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. The difference
∑N
n=1 1Φn on the right-hand side of (9) is bounded from above as
N−
n=1
1Φn ≤ C2(log |V0,N | − log |V0,0|).
Since |V0,N | involves the training data, for simplicity in our statement we further bound
it as follows. By the inequality between the geometric mean and arithmetic mean we have
|V0,N |1/d ≤ tr V0,N/d. Hence
log |V0,N | ≤ d log tr V0,N − d log d = d log(tr VN + tr V0,0)− d log d
≤ d log(tr VN + tr V0,0).
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If tr VN ≤ 1, then log(tr VN + tr V0,0) ≤ log(1+ trV0,0) ≤ tr V0,0. On the other hand if tr VN > 1,
then
log(tr VN + tr V0,0) = log tr VN + log

1+ tr V0,0
tr VN

≤ log tr VN + tr V0,0tr VN
≤ log tr VN + tr V0,0.
Therefore for both cases log |V0,N | ≤ d max(0, log tr VN ) + dtr V0,0. Let C3 = C2(dtr V0,0 −
log |V0,0|). In summary we have the following bound.
Lemma 3.3. The difference
∑N
n=1 1Φn on the right-hand side of (9) is bounded from above as
N−
n=1
1Φn ≤ dC2 max(0, log tr VN )+ C3, (16)
where C2,C3 depend only on the training data.
Note that (16) is true even for the case that limN tr VN < ∞. Note also that log tr VN is of
order O(log N ) even for VN = O(N γ ), 0 < γ < 1. However for trVN = log N we have
log tr VN = log log N .
3.3. Bounding the hindsight strategy from below
In this subsection we bound the hindsight strategy from below and thus finish the proof of
Theorem 2.1.
Consider the function (1+ t) log(1+ t), t > −1. By the Taylor expansion we have
(1+ t) log(1+ t) = t + 1
2
t2
1+ θ t , 0 < θ < 1.
By the definition of C1 in (15) we have
(1+ α∗N · xn) log(1+ α∗N · xn) ≥ α∗N · xn +
(α∗N · xn)2
2C1
,
∀N ≥ 1, − n0 + 1 ≤ ∀n ≤ N ,
and
Φ0,N (α∗N ) =
N−
n=−n0+1
(1+ α∗N · xn) log(1+ α∗N · xn)
1
1+ α∗N · xn
≥
N−
n=−n0+1
α∗N · xn
1+ α∗N · xn
+ 1
2C1
N−
n=−n0+1
(α∗N · xn)2
1+ α∗N · xn
= 1
2C1
N−
n=−n0+1
(α∗N · xn)2
1+ α∗N · xn
, (17)
where we have used the fact Eg∗N [x] = 0. By (10) the summation on the right-hand side can be
written as
N−
n=−n0+1
(α∗N · xn)2
1+ α∗N · xn
= α∗ tN V ∗0,Nα∗N = α∗ tN s0,N = st0,N V ∗−10,N s0,N . (18)
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In analyzing the behavior of (18) we need to be careful about the following fact: 1+ α∗N · xn ,
n ≤ 0, may be arbitrarily close to zero for the training data x−n0+1, . . . , x0. In particular we
might have different behavior between eigenvalues of V ∗0,N and and those of VN . To assess the
effect of training data let
AN =
0−
n=−n0+1
1
1+ α∗N · xn
and define the following event
E1 : lim sup
N
AN
max(1, log tr VN )
<∞.
Again max is needed only for the case that tr VN ≤ 1 for all N . We now show that Skeptic
can weakly force E1. Fix an arbitrary ξ ∈ Ec1, where Ec1 denotes the complement of E1. Then
lim supN AN/max(1, log tr VN ) = ∞ and hence there exists some n1 ≤ 0 such that
lim sup
N
1/(1+ α∗N · xn1)
max(1, log tr VN )
= ∞.
Then there exits a subsequence of rounds N1 < N2 < · · · such that
lim
k
1/(1+ α∗Nk · xn1)
max(1, log tr VNk )
= ∞.
Because α∗Nk · xn1 →−1 we have
lim sup
N
(α∗N ·xn1 )2
1+α∗N ·xn1
max(1, log tr VN )
= ∞.
If we compare this with the left-hand side of (18), we see that a single term xn1 of the training
data contributes arbitrary large gain to Skeptic in comparison to the right-hand side of (16). This
implies that lim supN logK∗1,N = ∞. We have proved that by SOS Skeptic can weakly force E1.
Therefore from now we only consider ξ ∈ E1.
At this point we distinguish two cases (1) E2 : limN tr VN <∞ or (2) Ec2 : limN tr VN = ∞.
Consider the first case and fix an arbitrary ξ ∈ E2 ∩ E1. For such a ξ there exists δ(ξ) > 0 such
that lim infN (1+ α∗N · xn) ≥ δ(ξ) for all n < 0. Then
V ∗0,N ≤
1
max(ϵ0, δ(ξ))
N−
n=−n0+1
xn x
t
n
and hence the maximum eigenvalue λmax,0,N of V ∗0,N is bounded. Then
st0,N V
∗−1
0,N s0,N ≥
‖s0,N‖2
λmax,0,N
and lim supN logK∗1,N = ∞ if lim supN ‖s0,N‖2 = ∞. Noting that lim supN ‖s0,N‖2 = ∞ if
and only if lim supN ‖sN‖2 = ∞, we have shown that by SOS Skeptic can weakly force
lim
N
tr VN <∞⇒ lim sup
N
‖sN‖2 <∞.
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Now consider the second case Ec2 ∩ E1. On Ec2 ∩ E1
lim
N
log tr VN
tr VN
= 0
always holds. Also on Ec2 ∩ E1
lim sup
N
tr V0,0(α∗N )
log tr VN
<∞ where V0,0(α∗N ) =
0−
n=−n0+1
xn x tn
1+ α∗N · xn
.
Therefore on Ec2 ∩ E1
lim
N
tr V0,0(α∗N )
tr VN
= 0.
Also
tr(V ∗0,N − V0,0(α∗N )) ≤
1
ϵ0
tr VN ,
and hence on Ec2 ∩ E1
lim sup
N
tr V ∗0,N
tr VN
= lim sup
N
tr V0,0(α∗N )+ tr (V ∗0,N − V0,0(α∗N ))
tr VN
≤ 1
ϵ0
.
Now on the right-hand side of (18), for every ξ ∈ Ec2 ∩ E1 there exists N0 = N0(ξ) such that
for all n ≥ N0
Φ0,N (α∗N ) ≥
1
2C1
‖s0,N‖2
tr V ∗0,N
≥ ϵ0
4C1
‖s0,N‖2
tr VN
.
Hence if for this ξ
lim sup
N
‖s0,N‖2
tr VN log tr VN
= ∞
then lim sup logK∗1,N = ∞ in view of Lemma 3.3. However on Ec2 the following two events are
equivalent:
lim sup
N
‖s0,N‖2
tr VN log tr VN
= ∞⇔ lim sup
N
‖sN‖2
tr VN log tr VN
= ∞.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
3.4. Better approximation to the capital process of SOS
Note that (13) is convenient because it gives an upper bound which always holds. However
bounding by Φ0,n(α∗n)− Φ0,n(α∗n−1) ≤ 0 in (12) is not very accurate. By expanding Φ0,n(α∗n−1)
at α = α∗n and by noting ∂Φ0,n(α∗n) = 0, we have
1Φn = 121α
∗t
n In(α¯
∗
n)1α
∗
n , α¯
∗
n = θα∗n−1 + (1− θ)α∗n , 0 < θ < 1, (19)
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where In(α) = V0,n(α, α) is a d × d positive-definite matrix given by
In(α) = −∂∂ tΦ0,n(α) =
n−
i=−n0+1
xi (α)xi (α)
t.
Comparing (19) with the right-hand side of (12), we see that the upper bound in (12) is about
twice the actual value of 1Φn . Now by Lemma 3.1 and (14), we can approximate 1Φn as
1Φn ∼ 12 log
|In(α∗n)|
|In−1(α∗n)|
.
We add over n and approximate the sum as follows:
N−
n=1
1Φn ∼ 12
N∑
n=1
log |In(α
∗
n )||In−1(α∗n )| =
1
2 log [IN ], [IN ] =
N∏
n=1
|In(α∗n )||In−1(α∗n )| . (20)
Hence from (8), (9) and (20) we obtain
logK∗1,N = log K¯∗N −
N−
n=1
1Φn − Φ0,0(α∗0) ∼ N D(gN ‖ g∗N )−
1
2
log [IN ].
The above result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The log capital of the sequential optimizing strategy logK∗1,N is approximated as
logK∗1,N ∼ N D(gN ‖ g∗N )−
1
2
log [IN ], [IN ] =
N∏
n=1
|In(α∗n)|
|In−1(α∗n)|
. (21)
Here we note that the quantity |In(α∗n)| also appeared in the evaluation of Cover’s universal
portfolio [3] under the name of sensitivity (curvature, volatility) index. Differently from the form
[IN ] in SOS, only the last term |IN (α∗N )| enters in the sensitivity index. This difference reflects
the fact that SOS depends on the intermediate moves of Reality’s path ξ N = x1 · · · xN , whereas
the universal portfolio is independent of them.
We found that the approximation (21) is extremely accurate in practice (cf. Section 6). Thus
we propose to use this approximation as an information criterion for selecting betting items. Let
us denote the betting game with d items by Game(d), and suppose that there is a sequence of
nested betting games such that
Game(1) ⊂ Game(2) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Game(d¯).
We also write the main terms of (21) in Game(d) as
logK∗1,N (d) ∼ N Dd(gN ‖ g∗N )−
1
2
log [IN ]d .
As a function of d, Dd(gN ‖ g∗N ) increases monotonically and log [IN ]d is also expected
to increase monotonically (cf. Section 6). Hence due to the trade-off between Dd(gN ‖ g∗N )
and log [IN ]d with respect to d , we can expect that max1≤d≤d¯ logK∗1,N (d) provides the optimal
number d∗ of betting items. The numerical examples in Section 6 will shed light on this point.
Finally we give a brief proof of Theorem 2.2. The point of the proof is to show that α∗N → 0
on E ′.
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Proof of Theorem 2.2. E ′ in (7) holds only if λmin,N →∞. Then by (17) and (18) we have
Φ0,N (α∗N ) ≥
1
C21
‖α∗N‖2λmin,N .
Note that log |VN | ≤ d log λmax,N . Therefore if lim sup ‖α∗N‖ > 0 then lim supN K∗1,N = ∞.
This shows that conditional on E ′ Skeptic can weakly force the event α∗N → 0.
However when α∗N → 0, for all sufficiently large N we can approximate
Φ0,N (α∗N ) ∼
1
2
stN V
−1
N sN ,
N−
n=1
1Φn ∼ 12 log |VN |.
Since log |VN | → ∞ on E ′, if lim supN stN V−1N sN/ log |VN | > 1 then lim supN log K ∗1,N =
∞. Therefore conditional on E ′, by SOS Skeptic can weakly force lim supN stN V−1N sN/
log |VN | ≤ 1.
4. High-frequency limit order SOS in multiple asset trading games in continuous time
In this section we generalize the results of [13] to the multi-dimensional case and apply SOS as
a high-frequency limit order type investing strategy to multiple asset trading games in continuous
time. We follow the notation and the definitions in [13]. For simplicity of statements we make
convenient assumptions and only present salient aspects of SOS.
Let Ωd denote the set of d-dimensional (component-wise) positive continuous functions on
[0,∞). Market (Reality) chooses an element S(·) ∈ Ωd . Investor (Skeptic) enters the market
at time t = t0 = 0 with the initial capital of K(0) = 1 and he will buy or sell any amount
of the assets S(t) = (S1(t), . . . , Sd(t))t at discrete time points 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < · · ·,
provided that his capital always remains non-negative. His trades up to time ti determine
Mi = (M1i , . . . , Mdi )t ∈ Rd , where M ji denotes the amount of the asset S j (t) he holds for
the time interval [ti , ti+1). Let K(t) denote the capital of Investor at time t , which is written as
K(t) = K(ti )+ Mi · (S(t)− S(ti )) for ti ≤ t < ti+1, (22)
with K(0) = 1. By defining
αi = (α1i , . . . , αdi )t, α ji =
M ji S
j (ti )
K(ti ) ,
we rewrite (22) as
K(t) = K(ti )

1+ αi · S(t)− S(ti )S(ti )

for ti ≤ t < ti+1
in terms of the returns of the assets given by
S(t)− S(ti )
S(ti )
=

S1(t)− S1(ti )
S1(ti )
, . . . ,
Sd(t)− Sd(ti )
Sd(ti )
t
.
Investor takes some constant δ > 0 and decides the trading times t1, t2, . . . by the “limit order”
type strategy as follows. After ti is determined, let ti+1 be the first time after ti when S(ti+1)− S(ti )S(ti )
 = δ (23)
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happens. This process leads to a discrete time bounded forecasting game embedded into the asset
trading game in the following manner. Let
xn = (x1n , . . . , xdn )t ∈ Cδ, x jn =
S j (tn+1)− S j (tn)
S j (tn)
,
where Cδ denotes the sphere of radius δ in Rd given by (23), and also write Kn = K(tn+1). Then
we have the protocol of an embedded discrete-time bounded forecasting game.
EMBEDDED DISCRETE-TIME BOUNDED FORECASTING GAME
Protocol:
K0 := 1, δ > 0.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Investor announces αn ∈ Rd .
Market announces xn ∈ Cδ .
Kn = Kn−1(1+ αn · xn).
END FOR
We now fix T > 0, and Investor trades in the time interval [0, T ] by SOS in (4). For A > 0
let
E A,0,T = {S ∈ Ωd | | log S j (x)− log S j (y)| ≤ A, ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, 0 ≤ ∀x < ∀y ≤ T }.
The Market is assumed to choose S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T , which means that all d items are active in some
time interval in [0, T ]. We define N = N (T, δ, S(·)) by tN < T ≤ tN+1. Note that by taking δ
sufficiently small,
N (T, δ, S(·)) ≥ A
δ
for every S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T , so that N → ∞ as δ → 0. The Investor’s capital Kδ(T ) at t = T is
written as
Kδ(T ) = K∗1,N

1+ α∗N−1 ·
S(T )− S(tN )
S(tN )

.
Since ‖ S(T )−S(tN )S(tN ) ‖ ≤ δ, we have from (21)
logKδ(T ) = logK∗1,N + O(1) ∼ N D(gN ‖ g∗N )−
1
2
log [IN ]. (24)
The strategy (10) is written as α∗N = α∗N (T, δ, S(·)) = V ∗−10,N s0,N . We now assume
(cf. Theorem 2.2) that δα∗N → 0 as δ → 0, i.e., Market chooses a path S(·) ∈ E ′T , where
E ′T = {S(·) ∈ Ωd | lim
δ→0 δα
∗
N (T, δ, S(·)) = 0}.
Then
α∗N =

N−
n=−n0+1
xn x
t
n
−1 N−
n=−n0+1
xn (1+ O(δ)) = V−10,N

L(T )+ 1
2
v0,N

(1+ O(δ)),
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where
V0,N =
N−
n=−n0+1
xn x
t
n, v0,N =

N−
n=−n0+1
(x1n)
2, . . . ,
N−
n=−n0+1
(xdn )
2
t
,
L(T ) = log S(T )− log S(0).
We consider the first term N D(gN ‖ g∗N ) in (24). As was indicated by (18),
N D(gN ‖ g∗N ) =
1
2
α∗tN V ∗0,Nα∗N (1+ O(δ)) =
1
2
α∗tN V0,Nα∗N (1+ O(δ))
= 1
2
[
L(T )tV−10,N L(T )+
1
2
(L(T )tV−10,Nv0,N + vt0,N V−10,N L(T ))
+ 1
4
vt0,N V
−1
0,Nv0,N
]
(1+ O(δ)). (25)
The middle term is dominated by the first term and the third term by Cauchy–Schwarz:
|L(T )tV−10,Nv0,N + vt0,N V−10,N L(T )| ≤ 2

L(T )tV−10,N L(T )

vt0,N V
−1
0,Nv0,N .
Thus we consider the behavior of the first term and the third term. Because Cδ is the sphere of
radius δ we have
tr VN = tr DN = Nδ2,
where
VN =
N−
n=1
xn x
t
n, DN = diag

N−
n=1
(x1n)
2, . . . ,
N−
n=1
(xdn )
2

.
Also the training data are of order δ. Hence tr V0,N − tr VN = tr D0,N − tr DN = O(δ2).
Let us decompose V0,N and v0,N as
V0,N = D1/20,N R0,N D1/20,N , v0,N = D0,N 1d , 1d = (1, . . . , 1)t,
D0,N = diag

N−
n=−n0+1
(x1n)
2, . . . ,
N−
n=−n0+1
(xdn )
2

,
where R0,N is the correlation matrix in {x1n , . . . , xdn }, n = −n0 + 1, . . . , N . Then
vt0,N V
−1
0,Nv0,N = 1td D1/20,N R−10,N D1/20,N 1d ≥
1
d
tr D0,N ,
because the maximum eigenvalue of R0,N is less than or equal to d.
Suppose that the Ho¨lder exponent of S(·) is 0 < H < 1 in the sense that
S(·) ∈ EH,T =

S(·) | 0 < lim inf
δ→0
tr VN
δ(2− 1H )
≤ lim sup
δ→0
tr VN
δ(2− 1H )
<∞

.
By combining the arguments so far, if S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T ∩E ′T ∩EH,T then the following implications
hold:
H > 0.5 ⇒ tr DN → 0 ⇒ L(T )tV−10,N L(T )→∞,
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H < 0.5 ⇒ tr DN →∞⇒ vt0,N V−10,Nv0,N →∞.
Also it is easily shown that the second term 12 log[IN ] in (24) is of smaller order than N D(gN ‖
g∗N ). We summarize our result as a theorem, which is a multi-dimensional generalization of
Theorem 3.1 in [13].
Theorem 4.1. By a high-frequency (δ → 0) limit order type sequential optimizing strategy in
multiple asset trading games in continuous time, Investor can essentially force H = 0.5 for
S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T in the sense
S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T ∩ E ′T ∩ EH,T and H ≠ 0.5 ⇒ Kδ(T )→∞ as δ → 0.
5. Generality of high-frequency limit order SOS
In this section we show the generality of the high-frequency limit order SOS developed in the
previous section. It implies that when the asset price S(t) follows the vector-valued geometric
Brownian motion, our strategy automatically incorporates the well-known constant proportional
betting strategy originated with Kelly [6] and yields the likelihood ratio in Girsanov’s theorem
for geometric Brownian motion. The convergence results in this section are of measure-theoretic
almost everywhere convergence.
When S(t) is subject to the d-dimensional geometric Brownian motion with drift vector µ
and non-singular volatility matrix σ ,
L(T ) =

µ− 1
2
σ 2

T + σW (T ),
where W (·) denotes the d-dimensional standard Brownian motion, and σ 2 denotes the d-
dimensional vector with the diagonal elements of σσ t. In this section we let T → ∞ and also
let δ = δT → 0 in such a way that | log δT | = o(
√
T ). We have
V0,N = (σσ t)T (1+ O(δT )),
and hence we can evaluate
α∗N =
[
(σσ t)−1µ+ (σ
−1)tW (T )
T
]
(1+ O(δT )). (26)
The first term on the right-hand side of (26) is the constant vector, which is derived also from the
so-called Kelly criterion of maximizing E[logK(T )].
Next consider N D(gN ‖ g∗N ) in (24), which was also indicated by (25),
N D(gN ‖ g∗N ) =
1
2
α∗tN V0,Nα∗N (1+ O(δT ))
=
[
T
2
µt(σσ t)−1µ+ 1
2
((σ−1µ)tW (T )+ W (T )t(σ−1µ))
]
(1+ O(δT )).
The log capital (24) is then expressed as
logKδT (T ) =
[
1
2
((σ−1µ)tW (T )+ W (T )t(σ−1µ))+ T
2
µt(σσ t)−1µ
− 1
2
log T + log δT
]
(1+ O(δT ))+ O(1).
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Hence the main terms on the right-hand side
− logK(T ) = −1
2
((σ−1µ)tW (T )+ W (T )t(σ−1µ))− T
2
µt(σσ t)−1µ+ o(√T )
provide the likelihood ratio of the unique martingale measure known as Girsanov’s theorem in
the multiple assets case, and we obtain
lim
T→∞
logK(T )
T
= 1
2
µt(σσ t)−1µ. (27)
Finally we discuss mutual information quantities among subgames of the multi-dimensional
bounded forecasting game. Let us denote the quadratic form on the right-hand side of (27)
by
Q(S) = Q(S1, . . . , Sd) = 1
2
µt(σσ t)−1µ, (28)
which designates the optimal exponential growth rate of Investor’s capital process with d joint
betting items S = (S1, . . . , Sd). We partition S into the following form
S[1] = (S j1 , . . . , S jk1 ), S[2] = (S jk1+1 , . . . , S jk2 ), . . . , S[m] = (S jkm−1+1 , . . . , S jkm ),
and assume that Investor is allowed to trade the above m groups of joint sub-betting items
successively during the one period of the d joint trading. Then the corresponding optimal
exponential growth rate of Investor’s capital process becomes
Q(S[1])+ Q(S[2])+ · · · + Q(S[m]). (29)
Note that among (28) and (29) for all possible partitions there is no general dominance relations
and this argument leads to the notion of mutual information between betting games, which will
be treated in a forthcoming paper.
6. Numerical examples
In this section we give some numerical examples using stock price data from the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The data are daily closing prices from January 4, 2000 to March 31, 2006 for several
Japanese companies listed on the first section of the TSE. There are T = 1536 daily closing
prices for each company.
From this data we construct a bounded forecasting game in the following manner. At first the
daily returns s jt = (S jt+1 − S jt )/S jt , t = 1, . . . , T − 1, j = 1, . . . , d of d items are transformed
to [−1, 1] by
z jt =
2s jt − s¯ jt − s jt
s¯ jt − s jt
∈ [−1, 1], s¯ jt = max
1≤t≤T−1
s jt , s
j
t = min
1≤t≤T−1 s
j
t .
Next 2d training data z˜t = (±1, . . . ,±1)t, t = 1, . . . , 2d , and a forecasting time F = cT, 0 <
c < 1 are prepared, and forecasting value for the j-th component is
ρ j = 1
2d + F
 2d−
t=1
z˜ jt +
F−
t=1
z jt
 , j = 1, . . . , d.
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Then the bounded variables xn = (x1n , . . . , xdn )t in the protocol are introduced as
x jn =

z˜ jn − ρ j , 1 ≤ n ≤ 2d
z j
n−2d+F − ρ j , 2d < n ≤ N = 2d + T − 1− F.
Figs. 1–5 and 6–10 exhibit the cases of three items Takeda, Toyota, Kirin with F = 0.17T
and F = 0.25T , respectively. The notations in the figures are as follows and their final values at
the end of round N are indicated in the figures.
K 0n = K¯∗n = exp(nD(gn ‖ g∗n)), K 1n = K∗n, K 2n =
K¯∗n√[In] ,
L K 0n = log K¯∗n = nD(gn ‖ g∗n), L K 1n = logK∗n,
L K 2n = nD(gn ‖ g∗n)−
1
2
log [In],
L D1n = log K¯∗n − logK∗n, L D2n =
1
2
log [In], L D3n =
3
2
log n,
G Rn = D(gn ‖ g∗n), Q Rn =
1
2
x¯ tn V¯
∗−1
n x¯n, DRn =
log [In]
2n
.
As suggested in Section 3.4, K 1n and K
2
n , L K
1
n and L K
2
n , L D
1
n and L D
2
n are almost overlaid in
the figures. We can also see that the actual log deficiency L D1n or L D
2
n is far less than L D3 which
is the typical log deficiency in the case of finite items such as in the horse race game. Furthermore
Figs. 5, 10 show that the deficiency rate process DRn gives the precise convergence border rate
for the growth rate process G Rn or its approximated quadratic rate process Q Rn .
Figs. 11–16 illustrate the cases of composite games
Game(1) ⊂ Game(2) ⊂ Game(3) ⊂ Game(4) ⊂ Game(5)
with five items 1. Takeda, 2. Toyota, 3. Kirin, 4. Tepco, 5. NNK in this order. As expected the
following trade-off can be seen in the figures.
L K 0n : G(1) < G(2) < G(3) < G(4) < G(5),
L D2n : G(1) < G(2) < G(3) < G(4) < G(5),
L K 1n : G(1) < G(5) < G(2) < G(4) < G(3).
Hence the choice of the three items 1. Takeda, 2. Toyota, 3. Kirin is the most profitable one in
the above composite games.
Figs. 17–20 compare the sequential optimizing strategy with the universal portfolio for one
item Takeda, Toyota, Kirin, an imaginary data, respectively. The universal portfolio in its simplest
form with one item can be performed in the following way.
Divide the closed interval A = {α ∈ R | 1 + αx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ D} of prudent strategies
into disjoint subintervals A1, . . . , AM . Then for the m-th account Am with the initial capital
K(m)0 = 1/M , Skeptic continues the game with constant betting ratio αm ∈ Am, m = 1, . . . , M .
His capital at the end of round n is expressed as KUn =
∑M
m=1K(m)n . The figures are the cases
with M = 100 and the notations are
K U0n = KUn without the training data {−1, 1},
K U1n = KUn with the training data {−1, 1}.
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Fig. 1. Closing prices of Takeda, Toyota, Kirin F = 0.17T .
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Fig. 2. Capital processes K 0n , K
1
n , K
2
n with their final values.
Figs. 20–22 show the case of an imaginary data given by
x−1 = −1, x0 = 1, xn = 1n + 1 , n = 1, . . . , 2000.
In this case L K 1n ∼ a log n−c, 0 < a < 1, c > 0, which contrasts with the case of coin-tossing
game L K 1n ∼ nD(x¯n ‖ ρ)− 12 log n.
Figs. 17–20 suggest that there is no general superiority between the sequential optimizing
strategy and the universal portfolio.
7. Discussion
In this paper we proposed a sequential optimizing strategy in a multi-dimensional bounded
forecasting game and showed that it is very flexible. From a theoretical viewpoint it allowed us
to prove a generalized form of the strong law of large numbers. From a practical viewpoint the
strategy is easy to implement even in high dimensions and its performance is competitive against
the universal portfolio.
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Fig. 3. Log capital processes L K 0n , L K
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n with their final values.
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Fig. 4. Log deficiency processes L D1n , L D
2
n , L D
3
n with their final values.
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Fig. 5. Rate processes G Rn , Q Rn , DRn with their final values.
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Fig. 6. Closing prices of Takeda, Toyota, Kirin F = 0.25T .
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Fig. 7. Capital processes K 0n , K
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n with their final values.
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Fig. 8. Log capital processes L K 0n , L K
1
n , L K
2
n with their final values.
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Fig. 9. Log deficiency processes L D1n , L D
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n , L D
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n with their final values.
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Fig. 10. Rate processes G Rn , Q Rn , DRn with their final values.
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Fig. 11. Closing prices of Takeda, Toyota, Kirin, Tepco, NNK F = 0.21T .
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Fig. 12. Log deficiency processes L D2n with their final values.
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Fig. 13. Capital processes K 0n with their final values.
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Fig. 14. Capital processes K 1n with their final values.
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Fig. 15. Log capital processes L K 0n with their final values.
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Fig. 16. Log capital processes L K 1n with their final values.
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Fig. 17. Capital processes K 1n , K
U0
n , K
U1
n for Takeda with their final values F = 0.16T .
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Fig. 18. Capital processes K 1n , K
U0
n , K
U1
n for Toyota with their final values F = 0.055T .
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Fig. 19. Capital processes K 1n , K
U0
n , K
U1
n for Kirin with their final values F = 0.085T .
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Fig. 20. Capital processes K 1n , K
U0
n , K
U1
n for an imaginary data with their final values.
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Fig. 21. Log deficiency processes L D1n , L D
2
n , L D
3
n with their final values.
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Fig. 22. Rate processes G Rn , Q Rn , DRn with their final values.
Theoretical comparison of our strategy with the universal portfolio would require more
detailed asymptotic investigation of the capital processes of these strategies.
In Section 4 as a limit order type strategy we considered successive stopping times defined by
a sphere of radius δ for the vector of returns (cf. (23)), which is based on the standard Euclidean
norm in Rd . We note that other boundaries based on other norms which are equivalent to the
standard one provide the same result stated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 2.1 for the case of supN VN < ∞ does not provide a game-theoretic version of
Kolmogorov’s three series theorem. It only implies that SN , N = 1, 2, . . . , are bounded.
However we expect that a game-theoretic version of Kolmogorov’s three series theorem can
be established by appropriate modification of our strategy.
Appendix. A convergence lemma
Let u1, u2, . . . be a sequence of points in Rd . We assume that they are bounded: ‖un‖ ≤ 1,
∀n, and that u1, . . . , ud are linearly independent. Define
yn = (u1ut1 + u2ut2 + · · · + un−1utn−1)−1un ∈ Rd .
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Then we have the following lemma. It is trivial for d = 1, but for d > 1 we need a careful
argument.
Lemma A.1.
yn → 0, (n →∞).
Proof. We first show that yn is bounded. Let λmin,d > 0 denote the minimum eigenvalue of
u1ut1 + · · · + udutd . Then all the eigenvalues of u1ut1 + · · · + unutn , n ≥ d, are greater than or
equal to λmin,d . Then all the eigenvalues of (u1ut1+· · ·+unutn)−2 are less than or equal to λ−2min,d .
Hence
‖yn‖2 ≤ λ−2min,d‖un‖2 (30)
and yn , n = 1, 2, . . . , are bounded.
Now we argue by contradiction. Suppose that yn , n = 1, 2, . . . , do not converge to zero.
Then there exists a subsequence nk , k = 1, 2, . . . such that ynk → a ≠ 0, (k →∞). In view of
(30), if unk → 0 then ynk → 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore unk , k = 1, 2, . . . , do not
converge to 0. Then there exists a further subsequence {n˜k} ⊂ {nk} such that un˜k → b ≠ 0. Then
yn˜k → a, un˜k → b. Consider
(u1u
t
1 + · · · + un˜k−1utn˜k−1)yn˜k = un˜k .
Then
(u1u
t
1 + · · · + un˜k−1utn˜k−1)yn˜k → b.
Multiplying by ytn˜k from the left we have
ytn˜k (u1u
t
1 + · · · + un˜k−1utn˜k−1)yn˜k = ytn˜k un˜k → atb.
Now the left-hand side is written as
(ytn˜k u1)
2 + · · · + (ytn˜k un˜k−1)2.
Note that for sufficiently large k, k′, (ytn˜k un˜k′ )
2 are all close to (bta)2. Since we have infinitely
many such terms, the left-hand side diverges to ∞ if bta ≠ 0. This contradicts the fact that the
right-hand side converges to a finite value. Therefore bta = 0. But then
lim inf(ytn˜k u1)
2 + · · · + (ytn˜k un˜k−1)2 ≥ (ytn˜k u1)2 + · · · + (ytn˜k ud)2
→ (atu1)2 + · · · + (atud)2 > 0,
which is again a contradiction. 
We also present the following corollary of the above lemma.
Corollary A.1. With the same notation and conditions as in Lemma 3.1
y˜n = (u1ut1 + u2ut2 + · · · + un−1utn−1)−1/2un → 0, (n →∞).
This corollary follows easily from the fact that ‖y˜n‖2 = utn yn and un is bounded.
Based on the above corollary we give a proof of Lemma 3.1. Before going into the proof, we
summarize some facts on matrix inequalities. For a symmetric matrix A, let A > 0 mean that
A is positive definite. If A ≥ B > 0, then B−1 ≥ A−1 > 0 (Lemma 4.2 of [2]). Note that
A ≥ B ≥ 0 does not imply A2 ≥ B2 (e.g. Chapter 1 of [20]), which complicates our proof.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. By the definition of C1 in (15) we have
V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n) ≥
1
C21
V0,n−1(0, 0),
where V0,n−1(0, 0) =∑ni=−n0+1 xi x ti is positive definite because of the training data. Write
1α∗n = V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1/2V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1/2xn(α∗n−1).
Then
‖1α∗n‖2 ≤
xn(α∗n)tV0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n)
λmin,0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)
,
where λmin,0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n) is the minimum eigenvalue of V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n). Let λmin,0,0 denote
the minimum eigenvalue of V0,0. Then λmin,0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n) ≥ λmin,0,0/C21 for all n ≥ 1 and
‖1α∗n‖2 ≤
C21
λmin,0,0
xn(α
∗
n)
tV0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn(α∗n).
For n ≥ 1, 1+ α∗n · xn ≥ ϵ0. Hence
‖1α∗n‖2 ≤
C21
ϵ20λmin,0,0
x tn V0,n−1(α∗n−1, α∗n)−1xn ≤
C41
ϵ20λmin,0,0
x tn V0,n−1(0, 0)−1xn .
The right-hand side converges to 0 by Corollary A.1. 
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